国际关系学界对两极体系的现有理解压倒性地来源于美苏冷战这一个案例。①以结构现实主义为代表的现有理论认为,美苏冷战产生的根本原因就是国际实力分布的两极结构。②肯尼斯·华尔兹(Kenneth N. Waltz)在《国际政治理论》中译本序言中说:“冷战植根于两极体系,只有在该系统崩溃的时候冷战才能结束。”③换言之,苏联解体致使两极结构终结才导致了冷战的结束;④只要两极结构存续,超级大国之间的对抗和危机就会持续发生。⑤但事实上,在早于苏联解体的1990年11月,美国总统布什就已经正式宣布:“冷战结束了。”⑥更有观点认为,早在戈尔巴乔夫决定大规模裁军和不介入东欧变革的时候,冷战就已经结束了。⑦按照这种观点,两极结构就不是冷战的充分条件,冷战可以在两极结构依然存在的情况下结束。不管我们如何界定冷战结束的时间节点,美国和苏联的战略竞争最终演化为一种更富合作性的关系却是历史事实。①两极结构没变,为什么两个极的关系变了?
大国的战略竞争是本文的核心研究对象,因此有必要对“大国”(great power)作出明确的界定。一种常见的对“大国”的理解是将其划分为能够构成体系一极的“超级大国”和“次等大国”(second-ranking great powers)两类。①还有一种做法是对“大国”作狭义的理解,将其仅指代那些能成为体系一极的国家。②本文采用第二种定义,“大国”仅指那些能够成为体系一极的超级大国。本文将不加区分地混用“大国”“超级大国”“极”三个术语指代同一类国家。除了“大国”以外的其他国家,尽管其规模和实力存在差异,在本文中均统称为“小国”。
其次,观念同样可能导致冲突,社会互动同样可能建构并固化敌对文化。根据理查德·勒博(Richard Ned Lebow)的国际政治文化理论,导致国家间冲突和战争的第一动因正是荣誉和地位这种非物质性动机。②根据塞缪尔·巴尔金(Samuel Barkin)的现实建构主义理论,在现实生存理念下,社会互动和观念建构机制将建构政治冲突,并将国家行为导向现实主义逻辑。③根据本·莫尔(Ben D. Mor)的研究,如果早期冲突事件与国家安全观念的某些组成部分相结合,国家将产生一种长期的威胁感,导致竞争迅速陷入僵局,由此又会导致观念与现实的自我强化,从而使信念、行为和结果陷入稳固的恶性循环。④总之,从观念和社会建构的角度,我们并不能对大国战略竞争的过程和趋势作出可靠的判断。
绝大部分学者持前一种论点。加里·戈茨(Gary Goertz)和保罗·迪赫(Paul F. Diehl)指出,国家间一旦形成持久性竞争,平均持续时间将超过40年。①在持久性竞争中,冲突和对抗水平既不随时间递增,也不随时间下降,而是保持大致水平的走势,而且这种走势基本不受国家主观干预的影响。两位学者将这种模式称为间断性均衡模型(punctuated equilibrium model)。②布兰登·瓦勒里安诺(Brandon Valeriano)认为,引发战略竞争的根本原因是相关国家采用所谓“权力政治战略”(power politics strategies)应对竞争对手的威胁和解决彼此之间的纠纷。一旦使用了这些战略,这些国家就将被锁定在竞争关系中,除非这些国家停止使用这些权力政治战略,否则竞争将不可避免,也无法消除。③
更悲观的观点认为,战略竞争一旦形成,其冲突程度将随时间的推移而升高并最终导致战争爆发。这种演化模式被称为“火山模型”(volcano model)。④保罗·亨塞尔(Paul R. Hensel)认为,战略竞争的冲突水平会随时间逐渐增加;一对对手的冲突历史越长,他们的竞争关系往往越容易被锁定,未来的冲突也将愈加难以避免。⑤迈克尔·麦金尼斯(Michael McGinnis)和约翰·威廉姆斯(John Williams)认为,在竞争中,信仰体系和官僚政策会随时间推移而变得愈发强硬,从而使竞争行为愈发难以消除。⑥大卫·德雷尔(David R. Dreyer)指出,当战略竞争涉及多个议题时,争议议题的累加会不断强化竞争双方对彼此的“敌人”认知,同时也会增加竞争所牵涉的总体利益,从而使竞争愈加难以停止和弱化。①
当然,也有少数学者认为,战略竞争的冲突水平并不一定会随时间推移而固化或升级。克劳迪奥·乔菲-雷维拉(Claudio Cioffi-Revilla)的实证分析显示,战略竞争的结束概率是一个关于时间的J型函数,亦即战略竞争结束的可能性随时间递增。②斯科特·本内特(D. Scott Bennett)也发现,战略竞争存在“正向持续时间依赖”(positive duration dependence),战略竞争持续时间越长,其结束的可能性越大。③但本内特自己也对这一发现感到困惑,认为这个规律有待做出理论上的解释。④
尽管学者们对于战略竞争进程趋势的认识存在分歧,但在如何改变既有竞争状态这一问题上存在共识。学者们普遍认为,要改变或停止战略竞争,需依赖外部环境的重大改变。戈茨和迪赫认为,持久性竞争非常稳定,要想打破这种冲突反复出现的稳定模式,必须引入某种巨大的外部冲击,例如世界大战、领土变更、国际实力分布变化、内战、民族独立等。⑤詹姆斯·莱西(James Lacey)也倾向于从结构层面理解战略竞争的演变过程,他认为大国战略竞争源于某种重大的系统性冲击,除非体系内出现新的更危险的威胁,或者原来竞争的某一方被彻底消灭,否则战略竞争关系将被锁定并且会不断加强。①约阿希姆·伦茨蒂赫(Joachim K. Rennstich)认为,大国战略竞争的强度取决于战略竞争所处时代的经济特征,当经济发展主要依靠外部网络联系、贸易和制造的国际相互依赖程度高时,战略竞争的成本大,因而战略竞争的频率和烈度低;反之,竞争频率和烈度高。②
建立大国战略竞争模型需要确定大国竞争的支付函数,为此必须明确大国战略竞争的目标,即大国为了什么而竞争。传统观点认为,大国战略竞争的主要动机和核心原因是土地。③事实上,包括大国战略竞争在内的绝大多数国际冲突及战争都受土地空间因素驱动或与其直接相关。①不过,也有学者指出,除了土地以及以土地为载体的物质利益,大国同样追求地位这种不能完全还原为物质的象征性因素②,地位是战略竞争的重要动机。①迈克尔·克拉雷希(Michael P. Colaresi)等学者因此将战略竞争划分为空间竞争(spatial rivalries)和位置竞争(positional rivalries)两类,前者的主要竞争目标是领土和土地,后者的主要竞争目标是地位。②
Ted Hopf, “Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War,” American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.2, 1991, p.475; R. Harrison Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?” International Organization, Vol.47, No.1, 1993, p.79; Dale C. Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,” Security Studies, Vol.5, No.3, 1996, p.29.
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肯尼斯·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,苏长和校,上海人民出版社,2003年,序言第19页。
Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No.2, 1993, p.152.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3, 1964, pp.882-883.
David Reynolds, “Beyond Bipolarity in Space and Time,” Diplomatic History, Vol.16, No.2, 1992, p.225.
Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983—1990 (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p.365; Deborah Welch Larson, “The U. S.-Soviet Rivalry,” in William R. Thompson ed., Great Power Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.383.
Deborah Welch Larson, “The U. S.-Soviet Rivalry,” in William R. Thompson ed., Great Power Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.372.
相关总结和分析参见:R. Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics, Vol.38, No.4, 1986, pp.546-576; Robert Powell, “Stability and the Distribution of Power,” World Politics, Vol.48, No.2, 1996, pp.239-267.
相关梳理参见文献回顾部分。
相关史实参见案例研究部分。
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Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No.2, 1993, pp.154-155; Paul R. Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.17, No.2, 1999, p.176.
相关讨论参见:Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No.2, 1993, pp.147-171; William R. Thompson, “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.39, No.2, 1995, pp.196-203; William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.45, No.4, 2001, pp.557-586; Douglas Lemke and William Reed, “War and Rivalry among Great Powers,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.45, No.2, 2001, p 468; Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson, “Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.39, No.3, 2002, pp.264-268.
Brandon Valeriano, Becoming Rivals: The Process of Interstate Rivalry Development (New York: Routledge, 2013), p.5.
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William R. Thompson, “Why Rivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries Can Tell Us about World Politics,” in William R. Thompson ed., Great Power Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.16.
George Modelski, World Power Concentrations: Typology, Data, Explanatory Framework (Morristown: General Learning Press, 1974), p.2; David P. Rapkin, William R. Thompson and Jon A. Christopherson, “Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Validation,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.23, No.2, 1979, pp.261-295; William R. Thompson, “Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.30, No.4, 1986, pp.587-615.
参见:Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No.1, 1993, p.75; Raimo Vayrynen, “Introduction,” in Raimo Vayrynen ed., The Waning of Major War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.13; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.29.
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Patrick James and Michael Brecher, “Stability and Polarity: New Paths for Inquiry,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.25, No.1, 1988, p.32.
例如:Michael D. Wallace, “Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cutting, and International War, 1815—1964: A Measurement Procedure and Some Preliminary Evidence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.17, No.4, 1973, pp.575-604; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Measuring Systemic Polarity,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.19, No.2, 1975, pp.187-216; Frank Whelon Wayman, “Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among Major Powers, 1816—1965,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.21, No.1, 1984, pp.61-78。
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3, 1964, pp.881-882.
肯尼斯·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,苏长和校,上海人民出版社,2003年,第218页。
R. Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics, Vol.38, No.4, 1986, pp.546-547.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” pp.881-909; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol.15, No.1, 1990, pp.5-56; Alvin M. Saperstein, “The ‘Long Peace’— Result of a Bipolar Competitive World?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.35, No.1, 1991, pp.68-79; Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, Vol.16, No.3, 1964, pp.390-406; Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.2, 1994, pp.252-259; Dale C. Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,” Security Studies, Vol.5, No.3, 1996, pp.29-89; Ariel Ilan Roth, “Structure and Stability Reconsidered,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol.17, No.3, 2010, pp.567-584.
Richard N. Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.10, No.3, 1966, pp.314-327; Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.64, No.1, 1970, pp.98-123; Charles W. Ostrom, Jr.and John H. Aldrich, “The Relationship Between Size and Stability in the Major Power International System,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.22, No.4, 1978, pp.743-771; Diana Richards, “A Chaotic Model of Power Concentration in the International System,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37, No.1, 1993, pp.55-72; Randolph M. Siverson and Michael D. Ward, “The Long Peace: A Reconsideration,” International Organization, Vol.56, No.3, 2002, pp.679-691.
Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” International Security, Vol.18, No.4, 1994, pp.108-142; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security, Vol.23, No.1, 1998, pp.141-170.
Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, “The Effect of Actor and Issue Classifications on the Analysis of Global Conflict-Cooperation,” Journal of Politics, Vol.43, No.3, 1981, pp.861-874; John A. Vasquez, “The Tangibility of Issues and Global Conflict: A Test of Rosenau's Issue Area Typology,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.20, No.2, 1983, pp.179-192; Compare Paul F. Diehl, “What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.29, No.3, 1992, pp.333-344; Ron E. Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes,” International Security, Vol.31, No.3, 2006/07, pp.107-138.
亚历山大·温特:《国际政治的社会理论》,秦亚青译,上海人民出版社,2001年,第386页;Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable?” European Journal of International Relations, Vol.9, No.4, 2003, pp.491-542.
Cameron G. Thies, “A Social Psychological Approach to Enduring Rivalries,” Political Psychology, Vol.22, No.4, 2001, pp.693-725.
相关批判参见:Petr Drulák, “Reflexivity and Structural Change,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds., Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.138-157; Katalin Sárváry, “No Place for Politics? Truth, Progress and the Neglected Role of Diplomacy in Wendt's Theory of History,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds., Constructivism and International Relations, pp.158-177.
Robert William Flawith, “The Regressing ‘Culture of Anarchy’ in Ancient China and Its Implications for Wendt's Progressive Constructivism,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.65, No.3, 2011, pp.263-282;冷鸿基:《制度内恶性竞争与春秋时期国际合作规范退化》,《世界经济与政治》2013年第3期,第115—133页。
Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security, Vol.23, No.1, 1998, pp.180-181.
Richard Ned Lebow, A Culture Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review, Vol.5, No.3, 2003, pp.325-342; J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Ben D. Mor, “Strategic Beliefs and the Formation of Enduring International Rivalries: Israel's National Security Conception, 1948-56,” International Relations, Vol.18, No.3, 2004, pp.309-329.
Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.49, No.5, 2005, p.743.
Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The ‘Volcano Model’ and Other Patterns in the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries,” in Paul F. Diehl ed., The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), pp.98-125; Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), chapter 9, 10.
Brandon Valeriano, Becoming Rivals: The Process of Interstate Rivalry Development (New York: Routledge, 2013).
Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp.168-172.
Paul R. Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.17, No.2, 1999, pp.175-206.
Michael D. McGinnis and John T. Williams, Compound Dilemmas: Democracy, Collective Action, and Superpower Rivalry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).
David R. Dreyer, “Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.54, No.3, 2010, pp.779-795.
Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, “The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model,” in Paul F. Diehl ed., The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), pp.64-97.
D. Scott Bennett, “Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.42, No.4, 1998, pp.1200-1232.
Ibid., p.1230.
Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.39, No.1, 1995, pp.30-52.
James Lacey, “Introduction,” in James Lacey ed., Great Strategic Rivalries: From the Classical World to the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp.2, 49-50.
Joachim K. Rennstich, “The Future of Great Power Rivalries,” in Wilma A. Dunaway ed., Emerging Issues in the 21st Century World-System: New Theoretical Directions for the 21st Century World-System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp.143-161.
John A. Vasquez and Christopher S. Leskiw, “The Origins and War-Proneness of Interstate Rivalries,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.4, No.1, 2014, pp.295-316.
John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Stephen Kocs, “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945—1987,” Journal of Politics, Vol.57, No.1, 1995, pp.159-175; Paul R. Hensel, “Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816—1992,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.1, 1996, pp.43-73; Paul R. Hensel, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,” in John A. Vasquez ed., What do We Know about War? (Lanham, MD: Rowman 【-逻*辑*与-】amp; Littlefield, 2000), pp.57-84; Paul K. Huth, “Territory: Why are Territorial Disputes between States a Central Cause of International Conflict?” in John A. Vasquez ed., What do We Know about War? pp.85-110; John A. Vasquez, “Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility of Peace: The Role of Territorial Disputes,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.18, No.2, 2001, pp.145-173; John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816—1992,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.38, No.2, 2001, pp.123-138; Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez, “A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919-1992,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.2, 2003, pp.275-298; Hemda Ben-Yehuda, “Territoriality and War in International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918—2001,” International Studies Review, Vol.6, No.4, 2004, pp.85-105; Dominic D. P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” International Security, Vol.38, No.3, 2013/2014, pp.7-38; Monica Duffy Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.51, No.2, 2014, pp.185-198.
Thomas J. Volgy and Stacey Mayhall, “Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.39, No.1, 1995, pp.67-84; Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security, Vol.34, No.4, 2010, pp.63-95; Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Zeev Maoz, Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks, 1816—2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.211-247; Thomas J. Volgy, “Major Power Status in World Politics,” in Thomas J. Volgy, et al, eds., Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp.1-26; Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul and William C. Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” in T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson and William C. Wohlforth, eds., Status in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.3-32; Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.17, 2014, pp.371-393; Joshua Freedman, “Status Insecurity and Temporality in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol.22, No.4, 2016, pp.797-822; Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa,” Security Studies, Vol.25, No.3, 2016, pp.385-419; Steven Michael Ward, “Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.61, No.4, 2017, pp.821-834; Andrew Q. Greve 【-逻*辑*与-】amp; Jack S. Levy, “Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894—1895,” Security Studies, Vol.27, No.1, 2018, pp.148-178.
William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, Vol.61, No.1, 2009, pp.28-57; Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry,” Review of International Studies, Vol.40, No.1, 2014, pp.125-152;宋伟:《联盟的起源:位置现实主义分析———以一战前英德联盟战略为例》,《世界经济与政治论坛》2017年第1期,第18—37页。
Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chap.6, 7.关于“权力”与“地位”的区分,参见:Itesh Sachdev and Richard Y. Bourhis, “Power and Status Differentials in Minority and Majority Intergroup Relations,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.21, No.1, 1991, pp.1-24.
David A. Baldwin, Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2016), pp.79-80.
Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, Vol.2, No.3, 1957, pp.202-203;丹尼斯·朗:《权力论》,陆震纶、郑明哲译,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001年,第3页。
Cameron G. Thies, “A Social Psychological Approach to Enduring Rivalries,” Political Psychology, Vol.22, No.4, 2001, p.697.
John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.157; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (London: Routledge, 1992); Miles Kahler and Barbara F. Walter, Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
William R. Thompson, “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.39, No.2, 1995, pp.204-217.
Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.44, No.3, 2000, pp.503-530; Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 6.
Randall L. Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict Over Scarce Resource,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp.45-46.
John A. Vasque, “Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.40, No.4, 1996, pp.531-558.
Alex Braithwaite and Douglas Lemke, “Unpacking Escalation,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.28, No.2, 2011, pp.111-123.
Paul D. Senese, “Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.49, No.4, 2005, pp.769-779; Toby J. Rider, “Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.57, No.3, 2013, pp.580-591.
Douglas M. Gibler, “Alliances That Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.1, 1996, pp.75-97; Douglas M. Gibler, “Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: The Effects of Alliances That Settle Territorial Issues on Interstate Rivalries,” International Interactions, Vol.22, No.4, 1997, pp.341-368; Christopher Sprecher, “Alliance Formation and the Timing of War Involvement,” International Interactions, Vol.30, No.4, 2004, pp.331-347; Paul D. Senese, “Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation,” pp.769-779.
Steven V. Miller and Douglas M. Gibler, “Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.28, No.3, 2011, pp.261-279; David R. Dreyer, “Issue Intractability and the Persistence of International Rivalry,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.29, No.5, 2012, pp.471-489.
Robert E. Kuenne, “Conflict Management in Mature Rivalry,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.33, No.3, 1989, p.555.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol.18, No.1, 2010, pp.59-65.
Nils B. Weidmann and Lars-Erik Cederman, “GeoContest: Modeling Strategic Competition in Geopolitical Systems,” Social Science Computer Review, Vol.26, No.4, 2008, pp.510-518.
Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.49, No.5, 2005, p.743.
Michael P. Colaresi, Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005); Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson, eds., Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-level Games (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011).
Daniel S. Morey, “When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.55, No.2, 2011, pp.263-275.
Daniel S. Morey, “Conflict and the Duration of Peace in Enduring Internal Rivalries,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.26, No.4, 2009, pp.331-345.
Alex Weisiger, Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), chapter 1.
Christopher Darnton, “Rivalry and Rapprochement in Early Cold War Central America,” Security Studies, Vol.20, No.2, 2011, pp.198-237.
Herbert A. Simon, “Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought,” The American Economic Review, Vol.68, No.2, 1978, pp.1-16; Reza Salehnejad, Rationality, Bounded Rationality and Microfoundations: Foundations of Theoretical Economics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Jonathan Bendor, Bounded Rationality and Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2010).
Richard K. Herrmann and Jong Kun Choi, “From Prediction to Learning: Opening Experts' Minds to Unfolding History,” International Security, Vol.31, No.4, 2007, pp.132-161; Hannes Ebert and Nicolas Blarel, “Power, Territory, and Learning: Explaining Pakistan's Persistent Contestation,” in Hannes Ebert and Daniel Flemes, eds., Regional Powers and Contested Leadership (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp.247-272.
Magnus Enquist and Olof Leimar, “Evolution of Fighting Behaviour: Decision Rules and Assessment of Relative Strength,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.102, No.3, 1983, pp.387-410; Russell J. Leng, “When will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.27, No.3, 1983, pp.379-419; Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, “Learning, Preference Change, and the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries,” in Paul F. Diehl ed., The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), pp.129-164; Ben D. Mor and Zeev Maoz, “Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.17, No.1, 1999, pp.1-48; Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Robert Powel, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.48, No.2, 2004, pp.344-361; Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration,” International Organization, Vol.70, No.2, 2016, pp.347-375.
参见:John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Philip H. Crowley, “Hawks, Doves, and Mixed-Symmetry Games,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.204, No.4, 2000, pp.543-563; Herb Gintis, “The Evolution of Private Property,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol.64, No.1, 2007, pp.1-16; Dominic D. P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” International Security, Vol.38, No.3, 2013/2014, pp.7-38; Ikjyot Singh Kohli and Michael C. Haslam, “An Analysis of the Replicator Dynamics for an Asymmetric Hawk-Dove Game,” International Journal of Differential Equations, Vol.2017, 2017, pp.1-7.
参见:John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games, pp.94-95.
John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.10-27.
表2提示该博弈理论上还存在DH(如果是土地拥有者则选择退让,如果是入侵者则选择强硬)这种“悖论”均衡。但由于社会惯例、损失厌恶、禀赋效应等因素,这种悖论均衡在现实世界中非常罕见,参见:John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.102-103; Michael Mesterton-Gibbons, “Ecotypic Variation in the Game: When is Bourgeois Strategy?” Evolutionary Ecology, Vol.6, No.3, 1992, pp.198-222; Hanna Kokko, Andres Lopez-Sepulcre and Lesley J. Morrell, “From Hawks and Doves to Self-Consistent Games of Territorial Behavior,” The American Naturalist, Vol.167, No.6, 2006, pp.901-912; Herb Gintis, “The Evolution of Private Property,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol.64, No.1, 2007, pp.1-16;张维迎:《博弈与社会》,北京大学出版社,2013年,第324—325页。本文下面的模拟仿真结果也印证了这一点。
Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker, “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics,” Mathematical Biosciences, Vol.40, No.1-2, 1978, pp.145-156.
在不对称鹰鸽博弈中,受禀赋效应、先动者优势等因素影响,拥有者在冲突中获胜的概率通常会高于入侵者的获胜概率,参见:G. A. Parker, “Assessment Strategy and the Evolution of Fighting Behavior,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.47, No.1, 1974, p.227; John Maynard Smith and G. A. Parker, “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests,” Animal Behaviour, Vol.24, No.1, 1976, pp.164-165; Magnus Enquist and Olof Leimar, “Evolution of Fighting Behaviour: The Effect of Variation in Resource Value,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.127, No.2, 1987, pp.187-205; Peter Hammerstein and S. E. Riechert, “Payoffs and Strategies in Territorial Contests: ESS Analyses of Two Ecotypes of the Spider Agelenopsis Aperta,” Evolutionary Ecology, Vol.2, No.2, 1988, p.124.
与上述大国战略竞争模型存在近似特征的邻国领土冲突也存在类似的“尊重所有权”现象。与人们的一般印象相反,争端挑战方通常并不参与高水平对抗,在大约一半的案例中,挑战方甚至一次也没有威胁或诉诸武力以试图控制争议领土。Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), p.103.
Paul R. Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.17, No.2, 1999, pp.187-188.
David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009); Tongfi Kim, The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol.36, No.4, 1984, pp.461-495.
当战略竞争双方在多个问题上存在竞争且这些问题相互关联时,单次竞争所涉及的利益(stake)会增高,参见:David R. Dreyer, “Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.54, No.3, 2010, pp.779-795.
这里可能会引发争论的问题是:两极结构下超级大国是否容易受到自己盟国的牵连?华尔兹的理论暗示不容易受牵连。他认为两极结构下小国与大国实力悬殊,小国变换阵营不会从性质上改变两极结构,因而也就不会实质性影响大国的安全,因此大国不会对小国进出自己的同盟阵营太过敏感。参见:肯尼斯·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,苏长和校,上海人民出版社,2003年,第228页。但也有相反观点认为,两极结构的一个突出特征就是其中的国家比在多极结构下更易受到联盟政治的影响。David J. Singer, Models, Methods, and Progress in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), pp.163, 242.另有研究表明,两极结构下联盟承诺的可信度比多极结构下高,参见:Louis René Beres, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol.25, No.4, 1972, pp.702-710.这意味着两极结构下大国更倾向于遵守自己的联盟承诺从而被小国盟国牵连。
Ron E. Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes,” International Security, Vol.31, No.3, 2006/07, p.128.
Paul F. Diehl, “Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816—1980,” The Journal of Politics, Vol.47, No.4, 1985, pp.1203-1211; Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816—1965,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.36, No.2, 1992, p.338; Paul D. Senese, “Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of Militarized Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.2, 1996, pp.133-161; D. Scott Bennett, “Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.40, No.2, 1996, pp.157-183; Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.50, No.1, 2006, pp.145-168; Surinder Mohan, “Ideology, Territorial Saliency, and Geographic Contiguity: The Beginning of India-Pakistan Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol.16, No.3, 2016, pp.371-407.
杨共乐:《罗马史纲要》,北京:商务印书馆,2007年,第61—63页;Simon Baker, Ancient Rome: The Rise and Fall of An Empire (London: BBC Books, 2007), p.19.
Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), pp.250-251;特奥多尔·蒙森:《罗马史(第三卷)》,张颖、杨苗译,重庆出版社,2018年,第39页。
Titus Livius Livy, The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from Its Foundation, Books XXI-XXX, trans.by Aubrey De Selincourt (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1965), XXI, 1, p.23;波里比阿:《罗马帝国的崛起》,翁嘉声译,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2013年,第143页。
理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须毁灭》,孟驰译,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2016年,第281页。
波里比阿:《罗马帝国的崛起》,翁嘉声译,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2013年,第296—297页。
Dexter Hoyos, Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.68.
杨共乐:《罗马史纲要》,北京:商务印书馆,2007年,第64—65页。
Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), p.255.
参见:Dexter Hoyos, Truceless War: Carthage's Fight for Survival, 241 to 237 BC (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2007).
特奥多尔·蒙森:《罗马史(第三卷)》,张颖、杨苗译,重庆出版社,2018年,第110页。
波里比阿:《罗马帝国的崛起》,第279页。
理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须毁灭》,孟驰译,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2016年,第332页。
Dexter Hoyos, Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.36.
Dale C. Copeland, The Origions of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp.211-216.
特奥多尔·蒙森:《罗马史(第三卷)》,张颖、杨苗译,重庆出版社,2018年,第103页。
Christa Steinby, Rome versus Carthage: The War at Sea (South Yorkshire: Barnsley, 2014), p.124.
Michael P. Fronda, Between Rome and Carthage: Southern Italy during the Second Punic War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.1, 5;特奥多尔·蒙森:《罗马史(第三卷)》,第144、172—173页。
Christa Steinby, Rome versus Carthage: The War at Sea (South Yorkshire: Barnsley, 2014), p.136.
杨共乐:《罗马史纲要》,北京:商务印书馆,2007年,第70页。
朱寰主编:《世界上古中古史(上册)》,北京:高等教育出版社,1986年,第230页。
理查德·迈尔斯:《迦太基必须毁灭》,第235、287页。
Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2006), chapter 7.
Thomas Harrison, “The Greek World, 478-432,” in Konrad H. Kinzl ed., A Companion to the Classical Greek World (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.511-517.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed.and trans. by Jeremy Mynott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.108.3-4, p.65.
Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.30-31.
“Appendix I: The Terms of the Thirty Years Peace,” in G. E. M.de Ste. Croix ed., The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London: Gerald Duckworth 【-逻*辑*与-】amp; Company Limited, 1972), p.293.
Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking Penguin, 2003), pp.3, 18-19.
Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and the Causes of War,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), p.128.
Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp.189-192.
P. J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World: 478—323 BC (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.68-69.
Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, pp.163-166.
Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and the Causes of War,” p.129.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed.and trans. by Jeremy Mynott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.115, p.68.
Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p.173.
P. J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World: 478-323 BC (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p.68.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed.and trans. by Jeremy Mynott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.40.5, p.27.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, 1.44.1, p.29.
Victor Alonso, “Peace and International Law in Ancient Greece,” in Kurt A. Raaflaub, ed., War and Peace in the Ancient World (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), p.216.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, 1.45.1, p.29.
Paul A. Rahe, “The Peace of Nicias,” in Williamson Murray and Jim Lacey, eds., The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the aftermath of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.51.
Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking Penguin, 2003), p.28.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed.and trans. by Jeremy Mynott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.28, p.19.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, 1.126-1.139, pp.73-83.
这是古希腊世界内部战争的一个重要特征,参见:Hans van Wees, “War and Peace in Ancient Greece,” in Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser, eds., War, Peace and World Orders in European History (London: Routledge, 2001), p.41.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, 1.71.4, p.43.
G. E. M.de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London: Gerald Duckworth 【-逻*辑*与-】amp; Company Limited, 1972), p.60.
Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and the Causes of War,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), p.131.
Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed.and trans. by Jeremy Mynott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.71.7, p.44.
W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, 950—192 B. C. (New York: Norton, 1968), p.108, quoted from Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and the Causes of War,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), p.160.
John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
John Lewis Gaddis, “Conclusion,” in John Lewis Gaddis, et al., eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.261-264.
Ted Hopf, “Polarity, The Offense Defense Balance, and War,” American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.2, 1991, p.490; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), chapter 1.
Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.105; Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.66, 72.
Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.3, No.1, 2001, p.40.
数据为笔者自行检索,数据来源见http://www.correlatesofwar.org。
Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.3, No.1, 2001, p.57.
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.230-231; Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.107.
Thomas G. Paterson, “The Defense-of-Cuba Theme and the Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History, Vol.14, No.2, 1990, p.256.
Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, trans.by Shirley Benson (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp.580-581.
William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton 【-逻*辑*与-】amp; Company, 2003), pp.572-573.
理查德·克罗卡特:《50年战争》,王振西主译,北京:新华出版社,2003年,第238页。
孔华润主编:《剑桥美国对外关系史(下册)》,王琛等译,北京:新华出版社,2004年,第368页。
Oleg Troyanovsky, “The Making of Soviet Foreign Policy,” in William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev and Abbott Gleason, eds., Nikita Khrushchev, trans.by David Gehrenbeck, Eileen Kane, and Alla Bashenko (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p.238.
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp.236-237; James G. Hershberg, “The Crisis Years, 1958—1963,” in Odd Arne Westad ed., Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank CASS, 2000), p.319.
Alexis Mamaux, The Cold War: Superpower Tensions and Rivalries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.149.
朱锋:《冷战中的美苏军备控制与裁军》,牛军主编:《冷战时期的美苏关系》,北京大学出版社,2006年,第182—183页;Alexis Mamaux, The Cold War: Superpower Tensions and Rivalries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.147-148.
Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, The Cold War, 1945—1991 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.120.
Tony McAleavy, Superpower Rivalry: The Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.69; Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1986).
Deborah Welch Larson, “The U. S.-Soviet Rivalry,” in William R. Thompson ed., Great Power Rivalries (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.372.
James D. Fearon, “Rational Explanation of War,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.3, 1995, pp.379-414.
事实上,近代领土和主权规范的产生源于类似的演化机制,参见:Shiping Tang, The Social Evolution of International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.106-107; Dominic D. P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” International Security, Vol.38, No.3, 2013/2014, pp.7-38.
Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.2, 1994, pp.249-277; Dale C. Copeland, “Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic Realist Theory of Major War,” Security Studies, Vol.5, No.3, 1996, pp.29-89.