Christer Jonsson and Karin Aggestam, “Trends in Diplomatic Signalling,” in Jan Melissen ed., Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, p.152.
信息不对称(asymmetic information),是指互动双方各自拥有对方所不知道的私人信息,或者说某些博弈者拥有其他人不拥有的信息。参见A.Michael Spence, “Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets,” American Economic Review, Vol.92, No.1, 2002, pp.434-459.
20世纪70年代中期,生物学界与信息经济学界开始对信号理论进行系统研究,自然科学与社会科学研究相互影响。参见Amos Zahavi, “Mate Selection-A Selection for a Handicap,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol.53, No.1, 1975, pp.205-214。
Raymond Cohen, Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signaling, New York: Longman, 1987, pp.4-10.
James Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics,” in David A.Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp.77-114.
参见James D.Fearon, Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crisis, Ph.D.dissertation of the University of California, Berkeley, 1992;张廖年仲:《敌对国家建立互信之研究:昂贵信号模式》,台湾政治大学2012年博士学位论文。
Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Kristen Monroe ed., Political Psychology, Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002, pp.301-320.
参见Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970;Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
Azusa Katagir and Eric Min, “The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach,” American Political Science Review, Vol.113, No.1, 2019, pp.156-172.
Philip B.K.Potter and Matthew A.Baum, “Democratic Peace, Domestic Audience Costs, and Political Communication,” Political Communication, Vol.27, No.4, 2010, pp.453-470; Chungshik Moon and Mark Souva, “Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.60, No.3, 2014, pp.1-25.
林民旺:《国内观众成本与国际合作》,载《教学与研究》,2009年第2期,第86—88页。
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press,1976, Chapter 3.
决策者可以通过情报系统来尽量收集国家意图信息,然而这是不充分的,国际关系中的信息不对称很难避免。参见Richard K.Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security,New York: Columbia University Press, 2009; Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War,Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” International Security, Vol.39, No.3, 2014/2015, p.87.
John J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York: W.W.Norton, 2001, p.31.
Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism,New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp.151-152, 154-155.
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2, 1978, p.201.
Charles L.Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics, Vol.44, No.4, 1992, pp.497-538; Charles L.Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol.50, No.1, 1997, pp.171-201.
Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” World Politics, Vol.49, No.3, 1997, pp.373-395.
David Scott, “China and the ‘Responsibilities’ of a ‘Responsible’ Power-The Uncertainties of Appropriate Power Rise Language,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.17, No.1, 2010, pp.72-96.
John C.Matthews Ⅲ,“Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matters?” International Security,Vol.21, No.1,1996, pp.112-146.
George A.Akerlof and Robert J.Shiller, Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015, p.xi.
Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, London: Penguin Books, 1959, pp.40-69.
参见Andrew H.Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
有一天,正在睡梦中的谢林被屋内的噪声吵醒。当他手持武器起床查看情况时,与一个同样持枪的窃贼遭遇。两人都明白一个危险的结果可能就在眼前。即使窃贼和谢林一样,都想在不发生冲突的情况下离开,但如果窃贼不知道谢林的想法,事情就会变得复杂:窃贼可能会认为谢林想向他开枪,这就会促使窃贼先向谢林开枪;同时,预测到窃贼可能认为谢林希望先向他开枪,谢林可能会考虑先发制人,向窃贼开枪。参见Thomas C.Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.
In-Koo Cho and David M.Kreps, “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.102, No.2, 1987, pp.179-221.
Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., Political Psychology, Mahwah, NJ: Earlbaum, 2001, p.390.
Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security, Vol.31, No.2, 2006, p.162.
斯彭斯是信息经济学(理性主义分析)的主要代表人物,杰维斯则开创了信号理论的认知心理学路径。参见Thomas C.Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960; Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970; Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
James D.Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol.88, No.3,1994, p.585.
James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.41, No.1, 1997, pp.68-90.
Austin Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,” International Organization, Vol.71, No.1, 2016, pp.103-131.
James D.Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” p.585.
Jessica L.Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization, Vol.62, No.1, 2008, pp.35-64.
这两种机制有可能同时发挥作用。参见Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S.Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.58, No.4, 2014, pp.919-935.
Hans M.Kristensen, U.S.Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning, Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005.
Robert D.Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol.42, No.3,1988, pp.455-456.
Daren G.Hawkins and David A.Lake, eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.19.
参见Lisa L.Martin, “Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,” World Politics, Vol.45, No.3,1993, pp.406-432; Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992; Lisa Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
参见Helen V.Milner,Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997;海伦·米尔纳著、曲博译:《利益、制度与信息:国内政治与国际关系》,上海人民出版社2010年版。
Kenneth A.Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization, Vol,53, No.2,1999, pp.233-266.
Kenneth A.Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.118-119.
例如Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, “Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises, ” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.46, No.2, 2002, pp.175-200; Alexandre Debs and Hein Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders and War,” American Political Science Review, Vol.104, No.3, 2010, pp.430-445; David Kinsella and Bruce Russett,“Conflict Emergence and Escalation in Interactive International Dyads,” Journal of Politics,Vol.64, No.4, 2002, pp.1045-1068; Brandon J.Kinne and Nikolay Marinov, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Credible Signaling in International Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.57, No.3, 2013, pp.359-386; Giacomo Chiozza and Hein E.Goemans, “International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.48, No.3, 2004, pp.604-619; Jonathan N.Brown and Anthony Marcum, “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy,” Security Studies, Vol.20, No.2, 2011, pp.141-170.
Kristopher W.Ramsay, “Politics at the Water【-逻*辑*与-】apos;s Edge: Crisis Bargaining and Electoral Competition,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.48, No.4, 2004, pp.459-486; Christopher F.Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918—94,” American Political Science Review, Vol.95, No.3, 2001, pp.633-647; Shuhei Kurizaki and Taehee Whang, “Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes,” International Organization, Vol.69, No.4, 2015, pp.1-32; Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventog˘lu, “Limited Audience Costs in International Crises,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.57, No.6, 2013, pp.1065-1089.
Brian C.Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp.1-8.
Jessica Chen Weiss,Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protests in China【-逻*辑*与-】apos;s Foreign Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp.20-40; Jessica Chen Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” International Organization, Vol.67, No.1,2013, pp.1-35.
Alexander B.Downes and Todd S.Sechser, “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,” International Organization, Vol.66, No.3,2012, pp.457-489.
Branislav L.Slantchev, Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.4.
Branislav L.Slantchev, “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises,” American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.4, 2005, p.533.
Kai Quek, “Type II Audience Costs,” Journal of Politics, Vol.79, No.4, 2017, p.1440.
James D.Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.3, 2000, pp.63-83; Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,” International Organization, Vol.57, No.4, 2003, pp.801-827; Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.47, No.3, 2003, pp.427-439.
Branislav L.Slantchev, “Audience Cost Theory and Its Audiences,” Security Studies, Vol.21, No.3, 2012, pp.376-382.
Branislav L.Slantchev, Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p.150.
Alexandre Debs and Jessica Chen Weiss, “Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.60, No.3, 2016, pp.403-433.
James D.Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol.88, No.3,1994, p.582.
Branislav Slantchev, “Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.50, No.2, 2006, pp.445-477.
Giacomo Chiozza, “Presidents on The Cycle: Elections, Audience Costs, and Coercive Diplomacy,” Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.34, No.1, 2017, pp.3-26.
Shuhei Kurizaki, “Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy,” American Political Science Review, Vol.101, No.3, 2007, pp.543-558; Branislav L.Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” International Organization, Vol.64, No.3, 2010, pp.357-388.
Jack Snyder and Eerica D.Borghard, “The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound,” American Political Science Review,Vol.105, No.3, 2011, pp.437-456.
Daniele L.Lupton, “Signaling Resolve: Leaders, Reputations, and the Importance of Early Interactions,” International Interactions, Vol.44, No.1, 2018, p.64.
例如,当美国宣布将在欧洲建造一个核基地时,这个信号并不涉及在发出信号时立即发生的沉没成本,而是未来承诺的分期付款成本。只有在未来兑现诺言阶段,核基地建设才是一个沉没成本信号。参见Kai Quek, “Type II Audience Costs,” Journal of Politics, Vol.79, No.4, 2017, pp.1438-1443.
Elizabeth N.Saunders, “War and the Inner Circle: Democratic Elites and the Politics of Using Force,” Security Studies, Vol.24, No.3, 2015, pp.466-501.
Joshua D.Kertzer and Ryan Brutger, “Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience: Back into Audience Cost Theory,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.60, No.1, 2016, pp.234-249; Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition,” International Security, Vol.42, No.3, 2017/2018, pp.7-36.
获胜联盟(winning coalition)也被翻译为“胜利联盟”,以维持政权稳定不可或缺的关键成员的相对规模等属性来刻画国内政治的制度特征。参见Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Domestic Explanations of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.15, 2012, pp.161-181; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.,The Logic of Political Survival, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003, pp.37-76; James D.Morrow et al., “Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, Vol.102, No.3, 2008, pp.393-400; Andrew W.Bausch, “Democracy, War Effort and the Systemic Democratic Peace,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.42, No.4, 2015, pp.435-447.
Hein Goemans, “Fighting for Survival, the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.44, No.5, 2000, pp.555-579; Hein Goemans, “Which Way Out? The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.52, No.6, 2008, pp.771-794;蒙克、曾极麟:《中国战国时期诸侯国的国内政治与对外战争》,载《世界经济与政治》,2021年第12期,第78—105页。
关于观众成本的批评与争论请参见《安全研究》杂志(Security Studies)2012年第3期的专刊文章:Marc Trachtenberg, “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” Security Studies, Vol.21, No.1, 2012, pp.3-42; Jack S.Levy, “Coercive Threats, Audience Costs, and Case Studies,” Security Studies, Vol.21, No.3, 2012, pp.383-390; Jonathan Mercer, “Audience Costs Are Toys,” Security Studies, Vol.21, No.3, 2012, pp.398-404; Marc Trachtenberg, “A Comment on the Comments,” Security Studies, Vol.21, No.3, 2012, pp.405-415.
O.R.Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.6, No.3,1962, pp.244-252; Arthur A.Stein, “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics, Vol.34, No.4, 1982, pp.505-526.
Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p.6.
Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, pp.1-20.
Dustin H.Tingley and Barbara F.Walter, “The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization, Vol.65, No.2, 2011, pp.343-365.
Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,1990, p.17.
启发式认知是一种“快速和节俭”的非理性信息处理原则,参见Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnerman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science, Vol.185, No.4157, 1974, pp.1124-1131; Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G.Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality,” Psychological Review, Vol.103, No.4, 1996, pp.650-669.
Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, “When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions,” Political Behavior, Vol.32, No.2, 2010, pp.303-330.
Stacie E.Goddard, “The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler【-逻*辑*与-】apos;s Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938—39,” Security Studies, Vol.24, No.1, 2015, pp.95-130.
参见Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance,” Security Studies, Vol.22, No.3, 2013, pp.405-435; Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret,” Security Studies, Vol.26, No.1, 2017, pp.124-156.
Matthew Adrian Castle and Krzysztof J.Pelc, “The Causes and Effects of Leaks in International Negotiations,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.63, No.1, 2019, pp.1147-1162.
Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, pp.1-20.
Charles S.Taber and Milton Lodge, “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.50, No.3, 2006, pp.755-769.
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, “Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol.34, No.2, 2011, pp.57-111.
Brian C.Rathbun, “Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad: Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.51, No.3, 2007, pp.379-407.
Todd H.Hall,Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015, p.10.
Ryan Brutger, “The Power of Compromise Proposal Power, Partisanship, and Public Support in International Bargaining,” World Politics, Vol.73, No.1, 2021, pp.128-166.
参见Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1996, pp.1-10; Dale C.Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?” Security Studies, Vol.7, No.1, 1997, pp.33-71; Jason Sharman, “Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation,” Political Studies,Vol.55, No.1, 2007, pp.20-37;王立新:《世界领导地位的荣耀和负担:信誉焦虑与冷战时期美国的对外军事干预》,载《中国社会科学》,2016年第2期,第176—203页。
参见Danielle L.Lupton, Reputation for Resolve, How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020.
Ann E.Sartor, “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” International Organization, Vol.56, No.1, 2002, pp.121-149.
Anne Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p.6.
Mark Crescenzi, “Reputation and Interstate Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.51, No.2, 2007, pp.382-396.
Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol.14, No.1, 2005, pp.34-62.
参见Robert F.Trager, Diplomacy: Communication and the Origins of International Order, Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Daryl G.Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, p.2.
参见Cathy Xuanxuan Wu and Scott Wolford, “Leaders, States, Reputations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.62, No.10, 2018, pp.2087-2117; George J.Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
B.O【-逻*辑*与-】apos;Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.244.
Mark Crescenzi, Of Friends and Foes: Reputation and Learning in International Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, p.20.
Joe Clare and Vesna Danilovic, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.29, No.1,2012, pp.3-27.
Jonathan Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in The Korean War,” International Organization, Vol.67, No.2, 2013, p.226; Jonathan Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” International Organization, Vol.64, No.1, 2010, p.8; Paul A.Kowert and Margaret G.Hermannt, “Who Takes Risks Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.41, No.5, 1997, pp.611-637.
参见Anthony Damasio, Descartes【-逻*辑*与-】apos; Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, New York: Penguin Books, 2005; Raymond J.Dolan, “Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior,” Science, Vol.298, No.5596, 2002, pp.1191-1194.
Edwin T.Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.3.
贝叶斯法则由托马斯·贝叶斯(Thomas Bayes)提出,关注人们如何利用新证据修改既定信念。参见Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1991.
参见Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
参见Janice Gross Stein, “Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner,” International Organization, Vol.48, No.2, 1994, pp.155-183; Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
Esra Cerag Cuhadar et al., “Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions,” Political Psychology, Vol.38, No.1, 2016, pp.39-54.
Michael C.Horowitz and Allan C.Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International Organization, Vol.68, No.3, 2012, pp.527-559.
Todd Hall and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Personal Touch: Leaders【-逻*辑*与-】apos; Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in International Affairs,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.56, No.3, 2012, pp.560-573.
Steven W.Webster and Bethany Albertson, “Emotion and Politics: Noncognitive Psychological Biases in Public Opinion,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.25, 2022, pp.13-20.
Amber A.Díaz, “Bumbling, Bluffing, and Bald-Faced Lies: Mis-Leading and Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations,” Ph.D dissertation of Duke University, 2011, pp.9-20.
Jonathan Mercer, “Audience Costs Are Toys,” Security Studies, Vol.21, No.3, 2012, pp.398-404.
James D.Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.38, No.2, 1994, pp.270-297; Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.39, No.4, 1995, pp.405-425; Alastair Smith, “Extended Deterrence and Alliance Formation,” International Interactions, Vol.24, No.4, 1998, pp.315-343.
Songying Fang and Erica Owen, “International Institutions and Credible Commitment of Non-democracies,” The Review of International Organizations, Vol.6, No.2, 2011, pp.141-162.
Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons, “Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.48, No.1, 1989, pp.221-237.
Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Kristen Monroe ed., Political Psychology, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002, pp.301-320; Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, pp.114-115.
王水雄:《社会学与博弈论相融合:社会博弈论》,载《学术研究》,2016年第2期,第52—59页。
Vivienne Brown, “An Intersubjective Model of Agency for Game Theory,” Economics and Philosophy, Vol.36, No.3, 2020, pp.355-382.
关于国际危机行为数据集(ICB)的介绍请参见Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld,A Study of Crisis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.
Hein Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.46, No.2, 2009, pp.269-283.
Danielle L.Lupton, “Reexamining Reputation for Resolve: Leaders, States, and the Onset of International Crises,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol.3, No.2, 2018, pp.198-216.
Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization, Vol.61, No.3, 2007, pp.821-840.
Graeme A.M.Davies and Robert Johns, “Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.57, No.4, 2013, pp.725-737.
Kenneth A.Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK.: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.119-200.
Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M.Grieco, “Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953—2001,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol.59, No.2, 2015, pp.440-456.
Peter J.Partell and Glenn Palmer, “Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon【-逻*辑*与-】apos;s Model of Dispute Outcomes,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.43, No.2, 1999, pp.389-405.
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AMT作为一种实验工具的有效性已经在社会科学的不同领域得到了检验,AMT招募的受试者比一般的互联网受访者更专注。参见Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, “Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.25, No.3, 1996, pp.329-353.
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张静:《案例分析的目标:从故事到知识》,载《中国社会科学》,2018年第8期,第126—142页。
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